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Abstract
Corporate governance is not a new concept. In fact the last 15 years has seen a surge in academic
publications and case law in relation to the lack of corporate governance. Research Gap is that
Company Directors are attending a “mad hatters’ tea party” when it comes to the implementation of
governance codes, with the recent spate of court cases involving breaches of directors fiduciary duties.
Methodology used was review of case law using archival data. This research looks at the type of case
law issues of corporate governance in Australia and in particular accountability, and relates the case
law to the Corporations Act (2001) to find where company directors are getting corporate governance
wrong. The findings indicate that perhaps the “if not why not” prescription, should not be an option
for corporate governance for some Boards. For some Boards the invitation from Alice to jump down
the rabbit hole into creative accounting and bad board behaviour at the “mad hatters’ tea party” is
just too great an incentive. Implications show that this review of important corporate governance case
law will assist Boards to concentrate their efforts on improving the environment they operate in, as
good governance equates to good business.
“In another moment down went Alice after it, never once considering how in the world
she was to get out again.” Carroll, Lewis (1865) Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland.
Keywords
corporate governance, accountability, transparency, directors duties
1. Corporate Governance Introduction
Corporate governance refers to the relationship among different participants, and defining the
corporation’s direction and performance, which includes the CEO, i.e., the management team, the
board of directors, and the shareholders (Prasad, 2006). From the agency perspective, corporate
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governance is “a system of law and sound approaches by which corporations are directed and
controlled focusing on the internal and external corporate structures with the intention of monitoring
the actions of management and directors and thereby mitigating agency risks which may stem from the
misdeeds of corporate officers” (Sifuna & Anazett, 2012). Separation of ownership and control in the
modern corporations became an issue by Berle and Means (1932). Recent research shows that there are
lots of concentrations of ownership among the largest American companies (Demsetz, 1983; Shleifer &
Vishny, 1986; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988), and that a relative higher level of ownership
concentration exists in other developed and developing countries outside the US (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998).
Corporate governance has been the subject of extensive scrutiny and controversy, particularly after the
corporate collapses of the 2000s and the recent global financial crisis. Much of the controversy started
in the Western countries, inspired by the early study of Berle and Means (1932). This classic analysis
of corporation control call into question the justification for shareholder wealth and raise a problem of
social ethics. But Berles’ observation shows a lack of empirical justification for the claims held by the
shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) advocate the financial theory of risk-bearing which hinges on
the separation of decision management and residual risk-bearing in the corporation. This separation and
specialization of decision management and residual risk-bearing leads to an agency problem between
agents and principals (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The governance problem is that those who bear the
residual risk have no assurance that the managers will act in the shareholder best interests, and
therefore bring in the costs of monitoring and preventing the exercise of such discretion described as
agency cost. The pre-occupation for corporate governance then is to mitigate the agency problem and
agency cost between shareholders and managers. One of the possibilities is to use corporate governance
as the mechanism for governing including boards of directors and to ensure sustainability through the
financial structure as proposed by Jensen (1986).
The World Bank defines corporate governance as the set of mechanisms available to shareholders for
influencing managers to maximize the value of shareholder’s stock and to fixed claimants for
controlling the agency costs of equity. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) defines corporate governance as a set of relationships among management, company board, its
shareholders and other stakeholders. Both of them imply the principal-agent model of the corporation,
and emphasise the importance of shareholder interest and company value. Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
define corporate governance as a set of mechanisms to assure financiers that they will get a return on
their investment. Corporate Governance then is an evolving concept. It dates back to the Code of
Hammurabi back in 1800BC when bartering traders agreed to the basic rules of business transactions.
The following table shows some of the international corporate governance regimes currently in place.
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Table 1. Timeline
Date
1800 BC

Document Name

Date

Document Name

Code of Hammurabi

1999

OECD Principles of Corporate
Governance

1991

Bosch Committee – Corporate

2001

Ramsay Report (Australia)

Practices and Conduct (1995)
1992

Cadbury Committee Report (UK)

2002

Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 (US)

1993

Hilmer Report (Australia)

2003

Combined Code Corporate Governance
(UK)

1995

Vienot Report (France)

2003

ASX Good Corporate Governance and
Best Practice

1995

Toronto Stock Exchange

2003

AS 8000 - 2003 Standards (Australia)

recommendations on Canadian

2004

CLERP 9 Act 2004 (Australia)

2004

Corporate Governance in New Zealand

Board practices (Canada)
1996

Report on Corporate Governance
in Hong Kong

1997

King Report (South Africa)

Principles and Guidelines
2010

Corporate Governance Principles &
Recommendations 2010 Amendments
(ASX)

1997

Netherlands Report (Netherlands)

2012

UK Corporate Governance Code

1998

Hampel Report (UK)

2017

Amendments as necessary

1998

Olivencia Report (Spain)

2019

Corporate Governance Principles &
Recommendations 2019 Amendments
(ASX)

2. Method
This research uses archival data to compare current case law activities to that of the prescribed
Corporation Act 2001 and the Corporate Governance recommendations by the ASX (2019). It also uses
case studies of each of the case law to develop an in depth analysis of the case to enable the comparison
to be made to legal obligations of Corporations Act 2001 and the Corporate Governance
recommendations by the ASX (2019), as described by Creswell and Creswell (2018).
Countries that have good corporate governance systems become not only attractive locations for
domestic companies to develop and invest (La Porta et al., 1998), but also for foreign investors, and
thus promote economic growth (Levine, 1999). However, corporate governance practices are different
from country to country. Companies in different countries are operating in different social, cultural,
legal and economic environments, as a result, each country has developed its own corporate
3
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governance system that serves its business operations best (La Porta et al., 1998). This paper
investigates the most significant cases that have helped to shape the current corporate laws in Australia
in relation to corporate governance. It also shows the link between the directors’ duties as imposed by
law (Corporations Act 2001) and the Australian Securities Exchange corporate governance
recommendations (2019) that listed companies must comply with.
“How puzzling all these changes are! I’m never sure what I'm going to be, from one
minute another.” Carroll, Lewis(1865), “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland”.
This leads to the Research Problem of “How have the Corporations Act (2001) for company directors
duties and the corporate governance regimes recommended by ASX (2019), been complied with by
listed companies in Australia in the last 10 years”. Research Question 1: Can the directors duties
outlined in the Corporations Act (2001) relate to the Corporate Governance recommendations by the
ASX (2019)? Research Question 2: What directors’ duties have been breached and resulted in court
activity in the last 15 years? To address the research problem, an organised, systematic and logical
process of research method, using secondary data will be used. The use of archival data involves the
research into case law of court cases involving the Corporations Act (2001) breaches.
3. Results
In order to answer Research Question 1: “Can directors duties outlined in the Corporations Act (2001)
relate to the Corporate Governance recommendations by the ASX (2019)” directors duties must be
investigated in terms of the specific references in the Corporations Act (CA) 2001 legislation. The
difference between Common Law duties and Equitable Fiduciary duties must be ascertained, and
specifically linked to a section of the act. Directors duties are broken down into Common Law duties
and Equitable Fiduciary Duties. Under the Corporations Act (S185), there are specific sections on
directors’ duties, such as S180 Reasonable care and diligence, S181 Good faith and proper purpose,
S182 Conflict of interest, S183 Confidential information, S184 Criminal liability, S588G2/3 Insolvent
Trading and Personal liability, and s1043A Insider trading.
Specifically then under common law duties, a breach of section 180 Reasonable Case and Diligence or
section 181 Good faith and proper purpose, will result in the use of section of S588G(2) which will
result in personally liable penalties. Under the equitable fiduciary duties section of the Corporate Act
(2001), section 182 conflict of interest and section 183 confidential information will able be in breach
of director duties. Other penalties under the act include Criminal liability (s184), as well and other
breaches such as Insolvent trading S588G (3) and Insider Trading (S1043A).
The commonwealth government recognises that all of these laws place a heavy burden on directors,
and has encouraged the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) to review these in light of state
legislations. Nicholson and Underhill (2012) discuss the “Personal Liability for Corporate Fault
Reform Bill” that imposes personal liability on company officers for offences committed by
corporations. The reforms came from the 2009 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) which
4
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intends to harmonise corporate wrongs with personal criminal liability. This has been replaced by the
Miscellaneous Acts Amendment (Directors’ Liability) Act No. 2, 2011 (NSW) (2011 Act) and was
subsequently replaced by the Miscellaneous Acts Amendment (Directors’ Liability) Act 2012 (NSW)
(2012 Act), which commenced on 11th January 2013.
Particularly after the corporate collapse era of 2000s, many countries have adopted some form of
governance code such as that of the Corporate Governance Council of Australia, with their Best
Practice Recommendations for listed companies on the Australian Securities Exchange (2019).
Although these are recommendations only, for listed companies in Australia, listing rule 4.10 dictates
that companies must address each of these governance initiatives, and explain if they have not adopted
the recommendation (if not why not). In particular for listing companies in Australia it is important to
link the Corporate Governance recommendations by the ASX (2019) to that of their Corporations Act
(2001) obligations as shown in Table 2.
In order to answer Research Question 1: “Can directors duties outlined in the Corporations Act (2001)
relate to the Corporate Governance recommendations by the ASX (2019)”, Table 2 suggests there is a
direct link between the application of the good governance recommendations by the ASX (2010) and
the application of the Corporations Act (2001) for any breaches of those recommendations by directors.
Directors therefore should be aware that even though the governance recommendations have an “if not
why not” regime, that a breach of the recommendation can be directly linked to a breach of the
Corporations Act (2001) which could lead to criminal or civil personal liability for Directors actions.
“I don’t think... “then you shouldn't talk, said the Hatter.” Carroll, Lewis (1865) “Alice
in Wonderland”.
Table 2. ASX (2019) and CA (2001)
ASX 2019
1:

Solid

Corporations Act 2001
foundations

for

Reasonable Care and Diligence S180, Good faith and proper

management & oversight

purpose S181

2: Structure Board to be effective

Personally Liable S588G(2)

and add value
3: Instil a culture of acting

Criminal Liability S184, Reasonable Care and Diligence S180

lawfully, ethically & responsibly

Personally Liable S588G (2)

4: Safeguard integrity of corporate

Reasonable Care and Diligence S180

reports
5: Make timely and balanced

Conflict of Interest S182, Confidential Information S183

disclosure

Reasonable Care and Diligence S180

6: Respect the rights of security

Insolvent Trading S588G (3), Insider Trading S1043A

holders

Good Faith and Proper Purpose S181
5
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Insolvent Trading S588G (3), Insider Trading S1043A, Good
Faith and Proper Purpose S181. Reasonable Care and Due
Diligence S180, Conflict of Interest S182, Confidential
Information S183

8:Remunerate

fairly

and

Reasonable Care and Diligence S180

responsibly

In order to answer Research Question 2: “What directors’ duties have been breached and resulted in
court activity in the last 15 years?” the following tables have been divided by sections of the
Corporations Act in relation to breaches of directors duties, and then linked to the corporate governance
recommendations.
Table 3. Personally Liable S588G (2)
Case Name

Breach of Law Companies Act

Commonwealth Bank of Australia

S588G(2) director found to be personally liable for debts incurred

v Friedrich 5 ACSR 115: 9 ACLC

by the company, as the loan was fraudulent and he should not

946
ASIC v Narain FCAFC 120

have signed annual report. ASX 2 & 3 breach.
Misleading information regarding chemicals and claims it could
stop spread of disease that was not backed up by medical advice.
Managing director held personally liable for the statements
588G(2).
ASX 3 breach.

Table 4. Good Faith and Proper Purpose S181
Case Name
R v Byrnes and Hopwood (1995)
183 CLR 501; (1995) 130 ALR
529

Breach of Law Companies Act
Court found that officers could still be in breach of duties even
when they thought it would benefit the company, but for an
improper purpose S181. ASX 1 & 7 breach.

ASIC v Rich44ACSR 341: 21

Non-executive chair failed to act with proper case and diligence,

ACLC 450-One.Tel

it also deals with the business judgement rule S181. ASX 1 & 6
breach.
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Table 5. Confidential Information S183/Insider Trading S1043A
Case Name
R v Firns 51 NSWLR 548: 38
ACSR 223

Breach of Law Companies Act
Held that it is was insider trading under s1034A as the
information was publically available even if no one had observed
it. ASX 6 breach.

ASIC v Southcorp Wines 203 ALR

Contravened continuous disclosure rules by communicating the

627: 22 ACLC 1

analysts before notifying ASIC S674(2), S183. ASX 3 breach.

R v Rivkin 198 ALR 400: 45
ACSR 366

Insider trading held s1043A as information that was material and
not publically available was used to buy shares. Court imposed
detention and a fine.
ASX 3 & 7 breach.

ASIC v Wizard 145 FCR 57: 219
ALR 714

Insider trading breach s183, S1043A in that information obtained
as a director that was not publically available was used for their
own purposes to purchase shares in other companies (even though
they made losses). Fined $400,000 and disqualified from being a
director for 10 years. ASX 3, 6 & 7 breach.

Table 6. Minority Shareholder Rights S136
Case Name

Finding/Description
Breach of Law Companies Act 2001

Gambotto v WCP 182 CLR 432:

Minority shareholder case where a proposed amendment to the

127 ALR 4147

constitution and subsequent compulsory acquisition was invalid.
To avoid administration and taxation costs was not a valid and
proper purpose S136. ASX 6 breach.

Table 7. Reasonable Care and Due Diligence S180
Case Name

Finding/Description
Breach of Law Companies Act 2001

AWA Ltd v Daniels t/as Deloitte

Problems with delegated authority and incorrect procedures for

Haskins and Sells 7 ACSR 759

reporting to a company board. An equal duty of care for both
executive and non-executive directors. That all should be familiar
with the business of the company. ASX 1 & 7 breach.

Vines v ASIC 55 ACSR 617: 23

Chief Financial Officer (CFO) duties of care and diligence, S180

ACLC 1387-GIO

negligence, and lack of due diligence in forecasting made public.
ASX 4 breach.

The Bell Group Ltd (in

Directors duties to consider the interests of creditors in a
7
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liquidation) v Westpac Banking

restructure for corporate debts. Banks were also found to assist in

Corporation (No 9) [2008]

the directors breach of duties and were fined.

WASC 239

ASX 3 breach.

ASIC v Narain FCAFC 120

Misleading information regarding chemicals and claims it could
stop spread of disease that was not backed up by medical advice.
Managing director was held personally liable for making the
statements. ASX 7 breach.

Jubliee Mines NL v Riley 253 ALR

Continuous disclosure should be balanced with no misleading or

673: 69 ACSR 659

deceptive conduct. Principle of “when in doubt disclose” should
be considered carefully as company should not also mislead the
market with incomplete information. ASX 5 breach

ASIC v Healy 2011 FCA 717

S180(1) directors breach as inaccurate financial accounts were

Centro Case

approved. ASX 4 breach.

ASIC v Fortescue Metals Group

Held FMG and Managing director Andrew Forrest breach of

Ltd FCAFC 19

continuous disclosure for engaging in misleading or deceptive
conduct concerning ASX releases and investor briefings to the
signing of framework agreements with Chinese companies. In
2012 this was overturned on appeal. ASX 5 breach.

Table 8. Insolvent Trading S588G(3)
Case Name

Finding/Description
Breach of Law Companies Act 2001

Commonwealth Bank of Australia

S588G(2)/((3) director found to be personally liable for insolvent

v Friedrich 5 ACSR 115: 9 ACLC

trading for debts incurred by the company, as the loan was

946

fraudulent and he should not have signed annual reports with
assets listed that the business did not own. ASX 1 & 3 breach.

ASIC v Plymin 46 ACSR 126: 21

Breach of statutory duty to prevent insolvent trading. Under

ACLC 700. Elliott v ASIC 10 VR

s588G requires individual directors take reasonable steps to

369: 205 ALR 594.

prevent a company from incurring a debt. Banned from being a
director and fined $25,000 and $15,000 respectively. ASX 4 & 7
breach.

“If everybody minded their own business, the world would go around a great deal faster
than it does.” Carroll, Lewis (1865) “Alice in Wonderland”.
Research Question 1: Can the directors duties outlined in the Corporations Act (2001) relate to the
Corporate Governance recommendations by the ASX (2019) are demonstrated by Table 2. The
8
Published by SCHOLINK INC.

www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/fet

Frontiers in Education Technology

Vol. 3, No. 1, 2020

Research Question 2 of what directors’ duties have been breached and resulted in court activity in the
last 15 years, has been shown by Tables 3-8.
4. Discussion
Figure 2 is a model based on the interactions between Directors duties as prescribed by Corporations
Law (2001) and the ASX Good Governance Recommendations (2019) and court cases from the
breaches. Entitled the LAG/LEAD model, it represents how company directors can avoid the court
system by instead of being reactive (LAG) they can be proactive (LEAD) by exhibiting good corporate
governance and compliance with Corporations law.

Figure 2. LAG/LEAD Model for Company Directors
The Business Judgement Rule s180(2) states that officers of a company are compliant with S180(1) if
they made a judgement in good faith for a proper purpose, they do not have any material personal
interest, they inform themselves about the subject matter to a reasonable level and they rationally
believe that the judgement is for the best interests of the corporation. Bryans (2011) discusses the
James Hardie case in relation to non-executives breaches of care and diligence in relation to ASX
announcements that were misleading and failing to request a copy of the announcement. In the Centro
case for example, Giordano stated (2011) that the directors failed to exercise their statutory duty of care
and diligence in approving inaccurate accounts s180(1), statutory duty of care and diligence, s344(1)
(reasonable steps to comply with financial reporting duties) and s601FD(3) in the failure of classifying
$1.75 million USD as non-current when in fact they were short-term liabilities. In 2010 Heath in
discussing the ASIV v Rich cases (2009) stated that directors are not responsible for unforeseeable
9
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risks, and a mistake or judgement of error does not automatically invoke s180(1) breaches, however
Directors still must understand company’s financial statements, a responsibility that cannot be avoided.
The answer to the Research Problem of: “How have the Corporations Act (2001) for company directors
duties and the corporate governance regimes recommended by ASX (2019), been complied with by
listed companies in Australia in the last 10 years?,” would be that every ASX governance
recommendation (2019) and every company directors duty imposed by Corporations Law (2001), has
in the last 15 years been breached resulting in a court case, with either criminal or civil liabilities
imposed, so there is a lack of overall compliance by listed companies in Australia.
Directors’ duties then are imposed on all Directors of all entities with serious consequences for
breaches both on a civil or criminal basis. This research has shown that corporate governance may
mean different things to different entities, but the Corporations Act (2001) is applied to ALL directors
of ALL entities. Directors should be made aware of these obligations. Adams (2004) describes
corporate governance as being not unlike a beauty and a beast, and that Directors who wish to do
“good” should carry out diligence, compliance with regulation and adhere to corporate governance
recommendations. All these recommendations however only add more to the burden already held by
Directors both paid and voluntary. Directors of all Boards then, need to be vigilant, aware of their
obligations, fully informed and ethical in all decisions they make for and on behalf of their boards, the
last thing they want to see is their company in the courts, and their decision questioned by a judge.
“My dear, here we must run as fast as we can, just to stay in place. And if you wish to go
anywhere you must run twice as fast as that.” Carroll, Lewis (1865) “Alice in
Wonderland”.
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